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The resolution of Third World conflicts was an essential part and a barometer 
of the superpower detente of 1985-91. Perhaps the most successful example of 
mutual participation in conflict resolution was the Nicaraguan case. Here a 
combination of superpower negotiation, regional peace packages, and acceptance 
of the results of the elections in February 1990, in Nicaragua resulted in the end of 
civil war and outside interference in Nicaragua. Much of the course of this exercise 
in conflict resolution is a matter of public record. ' However, what is not altogether 
clear is the Soviet political perspective and policy process that led, at the time, to this 
successful exercise in superpower partnership. 
This is to say that most analyses of Soviet policy in Central America stress 
Moscow's bilateral relationship with Managua, using rational actor models of a 
single state actor relating to another single state actor or else stress the superpower 
dimension, namely that the USSR viewed Nicaragua and its problems mainly 
through the prism of its effect on relations with the US and the American 
geostrategic position. While these approaches have merit, they do not tell the whole 
story. Accounts of the US-Soviet negotiations reveal that there were splits within 
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the policy.2 By the same token, the turn 
to the right in Soviet politics in 1990-91, culminating in the failed coup of August, 
1991, revealed a continuing debate between forces more or less sympathetic to Fidel 
Castro and, by implication the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, within the Soviet foreign 
policy community.3 
Therefore, single actor approaches to the problem obscure the differences 
among Soviet analysts and decision-makers, and conceal points of leverage brought 
to bear in this process by the other interested parties, namely Nicaragua and Cuba. 
Greater attention to this three-cornered, if obviously asymmetrical, debate over the 
period 1979-90 contributes to a better understanding of the environment within 
which Moscow perceived the Nicaraguan conflict and its fluctuating goals there. 
For example, it appears that the Sandinista government from the start was 
committed to the "revolution without borders" in Central America, and viewed its 
example as one that should trigger a general uprising there. That commitment grew 
out of the government's own ideology as well as a shrewd appreciation of what it 
took to win Moscow's support and assistance. Within days of their victory Moscow 
sent the Sandinistas a delegation to assess possibilities for cooperation with them. 
Also in 1979, the KGB recognized Central America's significance for future 
subversive operations.4 Nicaragua's commitment to a Leninist domestic and 
foreign policy undoubtedly was based, at least in part, on its own awareness of the 
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points made by Grenada's ambassador to the USSR that if Grenada (Nicaragua) was 
to be helped materially it had to demonstrate consistency in applying Leninist 
solutions in domestic politics and economics at home and display unwavering 
support for the Soviet line abroad. This support had to appear as taking the lead in 
influencing regional developments in the Caribbean (Central America).5 Armed 
support for the revolution abroad not only satisfied Sandinista emotional and 
ideological ambitions, it also was the test for Soviet bloc cooperation. And a second 
criterion of such assistance was Castro's strong support for the Sandinistas, whom 
he esteemed for their willingness to make the revolution and spread it abroad.6 
Arguably Castro and the Soviet governments of 1979-85 saw Central America as 
aplace of opportunity, and were also committed by their own sense of responsibility 
to contest the United States where it threatened "states of socialist orientation" 
whose policies had demonstrated that they "leaned to one side" and supported 
Moscow.7 
At the same time neither Castro nor the Sandinistas were content merely to 
take dictation from Moscow. Sandinista leaders were adamant about this point 
throughout their tenure in office.8 And Castro's independence needs no comment 
here. Both Cuba and Nicaragua after 1979 placed a strong emphasis on "exporting 
the revolution." Both saw this as their role in the anti-American struggle and 
counselled a more aggressive program of assistance for Nicaragua and revolution-
aries like the FMLN in El Salvador. During 1979-83, such views enjoyed some 
support among Soviet policy makers, but clearly Soviet perceptions were internally 
and institutionally divided. By no means did support for a forward revolutionary 
policy in Central America enjoy universal favor. 
Any examination of Soviet academic and political commentary on Latin 
America, and more specifically Nicaragua and Central America during 1979-90, 
immediately encounters the great diversity in opinions and outlooks among analysts 
and decision- makers on the issues involved in Soviet relations with these states and 
movements.9 These differences did not occur merely within the Soviet environ-
ment; that is, they depended upon competing perceptions of the context (mainly 
American reaction but also including Latin American reactions) within which those 
relationships take place. Sergo Mikoyan' s observations concerning policy in 1990 
are even more apposite for the late Brezhnev era. 
U.S. analysts mislead themselves when they believe that there are no 
important obstacles in the Soviet Union to a radical reversal of Soviet 
foreign policy. In the modern, pluralistic Soviet society there are 
articulate and dynamic sectors that do not support concessions or 
unilateral actions in arms reductions. Their opposition to new 
thinking in foreign policy is linked openly to a sometimes aggressive 
repudiation of the domestic aspects of Perestroika such as democra-
tization, Glasnost, de-Stalinization, and radical economic reforms. It 
would be a mistake to ignore their influence on the masses, trade 
unions, and those many apparatchiks and military personnel who fear 
their jobs may be eliminated as a result of arms reduction.10 
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Mikoyan also contended, contrary to much American Sovietological research, that 
the Brezhnev team had no strategy for Latin American policy, particularly Nicara-
gua. Moreover, when it did become clear that a pro-Soviet regime would come to 
power there, control over Soviet policy lay in the hands of the International 
Department (ID) of the Central committee led by Mikhail Suslov and Boris 
Ponomar'ev, inveterate Stalinists whose politics were, in Mikoyan's words, "ma-
licious, vengeful," and "incompetent."" Once it became obvious that Nicaragua 
really was a front of opposition to American regional policy and a source of support 
for other local revolutionaries, the ID went into action along with the military 
assistance program and the KGB to give substantial assistance to Nicaragua and El 
Salvador's FMLN. Thus the escort of the latter's Jorge Shafik Handal, on his trip 
through the bloc looking for arms aid in 1980-81, was the high ranking ID official 
Karen Brutents. Ponomar'ev even gave official voice to the extolling of the 
revolutionary path in Central America, thereby vindicating Cuban assertions of the 
1960s and enhancing Castro's standing in the Soviet policy process. In articles 
written in World Marxist Review and Kommunist during 1980-81, Ponomar'ev 
praised the Nicaraguan revolution as a "major success" and referred in general to 
the appearance of "states of socialist orientation" in Asia, Africa, and Central 
America. This formulation apparently included Grenada, which by 1983 was 
privately referred to in similar terms by Soviet officials. Also in 1983, a Soviet press 
article referred explicitly to Nicaragua in a similar way.12 
Military officials like Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff, also 
endorsed Nicaragua's and Grenada's efforts to obtain Soviet military aid and export 
the revolution. As Ogarkov told Grenada's Army Chief of Staff in 1983, 
The United States would try now and in the future to make things 
difficult for progressive changes in all regions and continents. The 
Marshal said that over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin 
America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is 
going on in El Salvador. The Marshal of the Soviet Union then 
stressed that United States imperialism would try to prevent progress 
but there were no prospects for imperialism to turn back history.13 
Ogarkov's remarks indicate that for Moscow what was central was the 
geopolitical and global anti-American campaign and that Nicaragua and Grenada 
were important to Moscow mainly in this connection. Thus the importance of 
revolution in Central America also appears to have been, for leading policy makers, 
if not analysts, a function of the state of Soviet-American relations at the time. 
Similarly, Nicaragua was rated then as more important than Grenada because 
it was under attack from the US and had already proven itself as a reliable partner 
for Moscow. According to Roger Miranda's 1987 revelations, by 1983 a secret 
Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan plan to upgrade Nicaragua's military potential was 
already being implemented. US support for the Contras and its evident determina-
tion to crush the Sandinista regime had only heightened Soviet concerns that 
Nicaragua be able to defend itself. In this sense Soviet statements in 1983-84 that 
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it would support Nicaragua politically to the best of its capability and communiques 
from meetings with Nicaraguan President Ortega that Moscow was confident 
Nicaragua could defend itself must be seen as more than a disinclination to 
challenge US power directly in Central America. Those statements also showed 
Moscow's hope of making Nicaragua self-sufficient or a least sufficiently difficult 
for the United States to attack, let alone win. In other words Soviet policy was a 
form, albeit very limited, of extending deterrence to Managua. 
Though Brezhnev told Raul Castro in the early 1980s that it could not fight 
in Cuba because "it is 11,000 KM away" and "if we go there we'll get our heads 
smashed," that was not the whole story.14 Moscow would continue to supply the 
arms it had arranged for but no more because not later than 1983 it realized that 
upgrading arms supplies beyond the limits it had set for itself and Managua could 
provoke the US into attempting a Grenada type operation there. That operation was 
widely reported to have caused divisions between Moscow and Havana over the 
issue of support for foreign revolutionaries and 1984-85 was a low point in these 
states' mutual relations. 
In retrospect it appears that Grenada, along with upgraded support for anti-
Communist insurgencies in Angola, Cambodia, and Afghanistan during 1983-86 
ultimately helped induce a change in Soviet thinking about regional conflicts in the 
Third World in general and Nicaragua in particular, because the Soviet perspective 
on US-Soviet relations also changed then. During the early 1980s, the Soviet view 
on regional conflicts in the Third World was one that saw conflict with pro-Western 
and US forces in starkly competitive terms. These were zero-sum contests where 
one side's gain was the other's loss. Soviet aggressiveness was displayed to the 
extent that US or pro-US forces were seen to have credible and thus deterrent 
military forces on hand. 
This credible deterrence was a prerequisite for any effort to solve a particular 
conflict (since general solutions were ruled out) and conversely its absence 
precluded Soviet interest in reducing regional tensions. Another way of saying this 
is that Moscow thought it could push forward in the Third World without meeting 
serious resistance from the United States. The Grenada invasion certainly changed 
the equation in Central America and the Caribbean and influenced Soviet thinking. " 
Their thinking also remained strongly attached to ideological conceptions that 
Third World radicals who called themselves socialists merited support as long as 
they conformed to the criteria above. 
This ideologically driven policy made cooperation with the US almost 
impossible and led Moscow into a trap whereby it missed the connection between 
regional conflicts and the Reagan Administration's hostility to Moscow. Local 
conflicts or wars were no longer risk-free; if anything they magnified the military 
tensions in the world and could have lead to a war where Moscow was dragged into 
a conflict to protect a state that was marginal to its vital interests, eg, Nicaragua. 
Moscow only gradually came to realize the danger it was running in 
Nicaragua. After 1983 it adopted a more defensive posture whereby the goals for 
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the area became securing the Sandinista government and secondly, running no risk 
of directly provoking the Reagan Administration. After all, by invading Grenada 
the latter had served notice that it might go further than destabilizing the Sandinistas 
by supporting the Contras. Since the Latin American revolution had turned out to 
be a chimera and the area was important only insofar as it detracted from American 
power abroad, high risks were ruled out. On the other hand, Moscow was now to 
some degree committed to defending the Sandinista regime and could not walk 
away from the Reagan challenge there. Therefore, Moscow stepped up military and 
economic aid from 1983-88. Even though Moscow's disinclination to run risks in 
1984-85 aroused Castro's displeasure this policy continued and served in-
creasingly to undermine the Soviet bloc's consensus for exporting conflicts 
into the Third World. 
For the Soviet Union to make changes in its policy toward Nicaragua and 
Central America it first had to change its policy toward Washington. Along with 
that change it also had to revise its outlook on Third World regional conflicts. This 
process occurred in 1984-89 and comprised an ideological shift to the "new 
thinking," and substantive institutional changes in the policy making agencies 
for both the Third World and the United States and fundamental changes in 
actual policy. 
These changes did not take place as simply as it appeared to Western 
analysts. Indeed, a more contradictory process than seemed to be the case was at 
work in the overall Soviet approach to resolving regional conflicts, Nicaragua 
included. The institutional changes in the Foreign Ministry and the International 
Department were not just due to Gorbachev's rethinking of Third World or Latin 
American policy in general, or did they come about solely because he desired to 
place his men in key positions to carry out his policies. Rather, the evolving 
approach to conflicts in Latin America, Asia, and Africa contributed to the process. 
Shevarnadze replaced Gromyko at the Foreign Ministry and Dobrynin took over 
from the octogenarian Ponomar'ev at the ID. Suslov had died in 1982 and nobody 
really replaced him as the party's oracle on Marxist revolutions abroad. Foreign 
policy appointments to ambassadorial positions in key states like Brazil, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua were numerous with two ambassadorial changes in each case occurring 
between 1985 and 1988 and more since then. These appointments went to party 
loyalists, apparatchiki, and professional diplomats, often Americanists. As a result, 
Soviet embassies and Foreign Ministry desks were now staffed by people who 
understood US sensitivities to Central American developments and/or could be 
counted on to influence Soviet policy with a view both to Washington and Latin 
American states. At the same time, the party apparatchiki could be expected to 
impose party discipline upon Cuba, Nicaragua, and Latin American parties.16 
Dobrynin likewise reoriented the ID toward more concern for US reactions 
to policy and also provided an opportunity for the dominance of the view of one of 
its leading Third World experts, Karen Brutents, regarding Soviet policy. Brutents 
harbored little optimism concerning the prospects of so-called states of socialist 
orientation. He saw most Third World countries choosing a capitalist or neo-
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capitalist affiliation with the world economy. Pro-Soviet states were economically 
retrogressive and plagued by insurgencies, many of which stemmed not only from 
Washington's machinations but from their own efforts to rush unthinkingly into 
copying the Soviet model. Their very vulnerability made them susceptible to 
Western pressures to vacillate in their foreign policies and made them less than 
optimal allies of the USSR. Brutents' suggestions pointed at a diversification of 
Soviet policy toward amicable relations with all states willing to do so, even 
capitalist states which were struggling against American economic or political 
interests as in Latin America. By building such relationships Moscow could create 
a wider circle of relationships with Latin America and secure its more traditional 
objectives of increased trade and political influence within an environment that was 
in any case not conducive to revolutionary offensives.17 
This restructuring of the ID not only led to increased skepticism about the 
socialist proclivities of states like Sandinista Nicaragua, but also to a curbing of 
Soviet support for revolutionary adventures. Since 1985, the main emphasis of its 
activity was to mobilize popular forces on behalf of the Soviet peace program and 
detente developed between 1987-90, and to support Soviet diplomacy and nonvio-
lent political actions at home. 
This policy did not sit well with Latin American revolutionaries, including 
the Nicaraguans, Cubans, and other Marxist parties. Their resistance to these ideas 
can be found in statements and policies during the middle and late 1980s. Former 
President Luis Alberto Monge of Costa Rica observed with reference to the 
Sandinistas that, 
I had four difficult years with them [1982-86]. Their idea was to 
provoke a crisis internally with strikes and invasion of land. With 
their army their intention was to control all of Central America. They 
were not going to invade but to create a conflagration internally.18 
Cuban official opinion also was fundamentally opposed to the basic thrust of Soviet 
policy ' s reorientation to the resolution of conflicts in the Third World together with 
the lessening of tensions with the US. For instance, Cuban Foreign Minister 
Malmierca returned from the 1989 Nonaligned Countries' Summit Conference and 
issued the following assessment: 
It is true that there are those who believe that if there is a certain 
alleviation of the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, that there is a certain detente between East and West, it must 
be an element to keep in mind the expression of positions by the 
countries of the Nonaligned Movement. We, on other occasions, have 
reiterated, and we can do it again now, that we must not suppose-there 
is no indication sign which permits us to believe in this—that Detente 




In a similar fashion, many Latin American Communists asserted that Washington 
had not given up its campaign of low-intensity warfare that they regarded as an 
integrated strategy of total warfare against them, and approvingly cited Castro's 
observations that detente with Moscow is seen in Washington as providing license 
for further imperialist adventures against Third World and Latin American states. 
In March 1989, an Argentinean Communist could write in World Marxist Review, 
the journal of the ID, that, 
The record shows that the victory of national and social liberation 
depends, firstly, on active involvement of the masses and the unity of 
the working class, poorer peasants and progressive intellectuals and, 
secondly, on organization and the readiness to use any form of 
struggle.20 
However, Gorbachev's appointments to key positions affecting Central 
American policy during 1985-88 did not necessarily signify a willingness to resolve 
the Nicaraguan conflict in the manner that eventually occurred. In fact, the 
widespread expectation on the part of American Sovietologists that Gorbachev 
would immediately cut back aid and military assistance to pro-Soviet regimes in the 
Third World—because their systems and his were undergoing visibly severe crises 
— was wholly misplaced. Quite the opposite happened until the Soviet economy 
failed and its East European satellites were no longer available to take up the slack 
as they had done in the 1970s and 1980s. According to US officials, Soviet aid to 
Nicaragua's government in 1989 was 80 percent of 1988's even though aid to the 
Contras declined to almost nothing. Meanwhile, aid to other embattled Communist 
states like Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Vietnam increased substantially,21 
and during 1985 Soviet-backed forces launched offensives in Angola, Mozam-
bique, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan (the last being the most brutal phase of the Soviet 
involvement in the war and lasted well into 1986). These offensives lasted several 
years in some cases, notably Angola's, and were accompanied by Soviet threats to 
destabilize Pakistan if US aid to the Contras continued.22 
Thus it can fairly be said that during 1983-87 a growing debate took place 
within the Soviet policy making elite — Politburo, ID, the Armed Forces, and the 
Institutes — concerning the range of issues bound up with Third World regional 
conflicts in general and Central America in particular. However, Gorbachev's 
institutional changes, though potentially helpful to the cause of de-ideologization 
of foreign policy and the search for a solvent policy based on joint conflict resolution 
with Washington, had not yet conceptually broken through the cobwebs of "old 
thinking." While the debate was joined, actual policy was torn by conflicting 
impulses. 
It was only in 1987-88 that the impasse in Soviet policy toward regional 
conflicts, particularly in Central America, broke up. This trend may be attributed 
to at least four developments that opened the door to a change in thinking and, 
subsequently, in policy. First was the success of negotiations on Afghanistan, the 
most important of these conflicts for Moscow and the most vital in terms of Soviet 
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security. The increasing likelihood of a negotiated superpower solution there, as in 
the INF treaty process, strengthened the hands of those who argued that negotiation 
with the US on vital security issues, with the end of strengthening both sides' mutual 
security, was viable and productive for the USSR. Soviet officials and commenta-
tors explicitly stated that the process by which agreement in Afghanistan's case was 
negotiated could serve as a model for resolving other conflicts. 
The second and third causes for the breakthrough toward progress on Central 
America were the ascendancy of Shevarnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in the policy process over the ID and those arguing for more military support for 
Nicaragua. That ascendancy was linked to the rise and dissemination of new 
thinking and its tenets concerning regional conflict in the Third World. As 
numerous accounts indicate, Shevarnadze's and the MFA's rise were a result of the 
acceptance of the new thinking. The fourth cause was the growing possibility of 
winning concrete economic and political benefits in Latin America as a whole 
thanks to the new way of viewing the continent that derived from new thinking. 
What made those opportunities real was Central and South American states' 
intervention through the Contadora process, the two Esquipulas accords, and the 
Arias plan, by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica to resolve the wars in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador. Even former military hawks and leaders of the ID, like Brutents, 
accepted the principles involved in the new thinking once it became clear they could 
enhance Soviet security. 
Evgeni Dolgopolov, a'prominent advocate of the "international mis-
sion" of the Soviet armed forces under Brezhnev, for example, outlined a 
process for resolving such conflicts. First, dialogue between the combatants 
(or their superpower patrons) would begin with the good offices of the UN or 
some other neutral intermediary, eg, regional groups like ASEAN in Southeast 
Asia or the Contadora group. Second was the withdrawal of foreign troops, 
balanced by guarantees to the country(ies) involved. Third were political 
guarantees jointly assured by the superpowers and the UN. Finally, the 
military provisions of the agreement stipulated an agreed process and timeta-
ble for withdrawal of foreign troops, technicians, foreign military aid, and 
demilitarization of the belligerents.21 
In a television interview in early 1988, Brutents and then Deputy Foreign 
Minister Vorontsov listed four universal principles that might be embodied in the 
process of resolving such conflicts. Brutents stated that there must be respect for 
the interests of all involved — the balance of interests of all participants, the states 
involved must be able to define their interests in "a sovereign way," these problems 
must not be viewed exclusively in terms of superpower rivalry, and international 
solutions, perhaps involving the UN, could protect accords from demagogues on all 
sides.24 Subsequent Soviet suggestions, by both officials and Institutchiki offering 
their recommendations, built upon these principles. The most outstanding example 
is that of Evgeni Primakov who offered what must be regarded as an official 
perspective in 1988. 
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Primakov underscored the new realization that regional conflicts imperiled 
the US-Soviet relationship without adding necessarily to Moscow's security. That 
situation forced Moscow, therefore, to reflect more precisely upon exporting 
revolution or Americans exporting counterrevolution abroad. This process was also 
one that its allies had to go through; an obvious hint to Nicaragua, among others, that 
its requests for endless aid and arms was not necessarily in Moscow's interests or 
theirs as seen from Moscow. However, the USSR maintained its firm support for 
a policy against the export of counterrevolution to countries where "progressive 
forces have come to power."25 Primakov also stated that it was first necessary to 
reduce the transfer of arms to combatants in these conflicts at the same time as 
progress in resolving political issues occurred.26 This coincided with the analysis 
of Brutents and Dolgopolov. Primakov went on from there to advance a series of 
points that were conducive to ending a Third world conflict peacefully. 
First, since there is no such thing as a purely internal civil war isolated from 
the international rivalries of the superpowers, the USSR had to strive to withdraw 
the "extra-national" element from these conflicts. Once that happened chances for 
conflict resolution improved. Second, national reconciliation was the only accept-
able platform by which to obtain the participation of neighboring interested states 
like the Contadora group and was a real option for terminating the domestic bases 
of conflict. Third, to moderate the intrusion of external influence a kind of "code 
of conduct" or "rules of conduct" for the superpowers should be negotiated. They 
should stop using these wars either as reasons or as pretexts for increasing their 
military presence in these areas because that is precisely how these wars got 
entangled in the superpower rivalry.27 
Carefully examined, Primakov's proposals indicated that Moscow would no 
longer inject its own or Cuban troops in Soviet platforms into new conflicts. 
Second, it would defend pro-Soviet regimes under attack by continuing high levels 
of military and other forms of aid. But at the same time it would encourage these 
states to fashion national reconciliation programs, eg, elections or coalitions that 
would moderate domestic tensions within them. Moscow undoubtedly believed 
that such moves would ease internal stresses while leaving the substance of power 
in its clients' hands. Third, it would seek to involve all the relevant players in the 
conflict resolution process. 
In this case the various Central and Latin American states' efforts to mediate 
the conflict corresponded with this tactic. The object of this "solicitation" was to 
encourage these states to solve, as far as possible, regional issues while phasing out 
superpower military influence. Yet at the same time, since Moscow was fully 
involved politically, it would have a legitimate standing as a "dialogue partner" in 
any further resolution of regional security issues. In Nicaragua's case this program 
was fully compatible with the emerging view, licensed by Brutents, of what Soviet 
policy toward the Hispanic American world should be. 
Fourth, the USSR needed a lasting and stable conflict resolution process with 
the United States that would jointly limit arms transfers to belligerent states as well 
15 
Fall 1993 
as other hostile policies. This conflict regime would entail substantial UN 
monitoring, inspection, and treaty verification. The extreme example of this was the 
UN's planned takeover of Cambodia, an example that unfortunately has not yet 
succeeded.28 
As these views toward conflict resolution gathered prominence at home, and 
proved themselves in negotiations over Afghanistan, Angola, and in the INF treaty, 
they provided an intellectual platform for revising views on Latin America in 
general and this conflict in particular. More precisely, nonrevolutionary views of 
Soviet policy desiderata for Latin America gained prominence because the balance 
of forces inside the Soviet government had swung away from the Ponomar'ev-
Suslov view to emphasize trade, classical diplomacy, and the adjustment of 
mutually congruent political positions on behalf of Soviet state interests. 
This process in general is taken to have signified the deideologization of 
Soviet foreign policy. And in the Central American situation these global principles 
were, over the course of time, regionalized and operationalized in Soviet foreign 
policy. Thus new thinkers, as they began to make their voices heard in policy during 
1985-90, advanced several principles pertinent to both the conflict in and around 
Nicaragua and to Latin America at large. These analysts saw the conflict in Central 
America as one that prolonged Soviet-American tension as well as the crisis in 
Central America, which had no end in sight. 
Second, their diagnosis.of the roots of this regional crisis pointed to the 
primacy of socioeconomic causes, the answer to which was a profound economic 
restructuring of Nicaragua and its neighbors. Nor did the growing Soviet economic 
crisis augur well for continued copying of that example in Central America. Third, 
Reagan's program of military support for the Contras faced strong opposition at 
home and abroad. If Moscow wanted to ensure that the Sandinistas remained in 
power, it should therefore address itself not to prolonging the war by arms supplies, 
but to helping to solve problems of democratization in Nicaragua to reduce 
American pressure. The fourth point was that the policy of arms transfers 
aggravated an already dangerous situation regionally and increased American 
threat perceptions, which these scholars acknowledged to be real, not fictitious, 
obstacles. 
Fifth came the argument on economic grounds. This not only stressed the 
costly burden on the USSR, it also tied that high level of Soviet bloc economic and 
military assistance to undesirable trends within Nicaragua. In the words of one 
analyst, 
Recognizing that one of the strongest arguments used by the Reagan 
Administration to gain support for its policies was the shift toward the 
Cuban model of development for Nicaragua, and anticipating possi-
ble future heavy demands on Soviet aid programs, it was believed that 
Soviet efforts to propel a socialist reconstruction of Nicaragua should 
be halted. The Sandinistas seemed quite satisfied with their wartime 
economy as a means to cover their incompetence in economic policies 
16 
Conflict Quarterly 
and were seen as increasingly likely to demand ever higher levels of 
scarce Soviet foreign aid. Moreover, a Soviet Union in political 
paralysis and economic decay hardly had the moral authority or 
practical knowledge to tutor the Nicaraguans in economics.29 
Therefore, these analysts reasoned that Moscow should terminate military aid to 
Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador and allow Latin American countries to craft 
their own solution to these conflicts. Failure to do so risked a constant exacerbation 
of Soviet-American tensions due to regional events.30 
These recommendations became embodied in a broader set of principles that 
Soviet scholars and officials claimed came to govern Soviet policy. First is the fact 
that the primacy of global and human interests in foreign policy dictates that no 
aspect of Soviet policy toward Latin America contradict that requirement. In 
practice, this took the form of diplomatic and political campaigns for peace, 
disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and so on, which 
took precedence over other interests. Arms sales too had to be limited and hopefully 
curtailed by both unilateral and multilateral measures. 
Second, Latin Americans should be free to decide their own fate without 
superpower interference. Latin American revolutions would be evaluated, not from 
the standpoint of superpower geopolitical interests, but from that of the people 
involved. Therefore, Moscow must abstain from intervening either for or against 
purely domestic affairs of third countries. It should be noted that this "self-denying 
ordinance" should also, accordingly, have applied to Washington and its proclivi-
ties to intervene in Latin America, eg, against Noriega in Panama. Third, should 
violent conflict break out in Latin America between states, every effort should be 
made to resolve it peacefully through the UN or the O AS. Neither direct nor indirect 
superpower intervention should occur. Economic development had to take place on 
behalf of the constructive resolution of the debt and other problems of Latin 
American economics. While Moscow's role here was perforce secondary, nonethe-
less, its sympathies clearly lay with the poor. 
Fourth, the new political thinking by no means presupposed a break with 
Cuba. Moscow could not simply erase 30 years of friendship with Cuba. On the 
other hand, the relationship should not simply stand still but should be changed by 
Moscow on the basis of the new thinking, Perestroika, and Glasnost. Fifth, the 
Soviet Union was ready to enter into productive diplomatic and economic relations 
with all countries in Latin America who would not use those relations against the 
"rights and aspirations of the people of these countries." 
Sixth, special attention should be paid to those states who were willing to 
conclude mutually beneficial economic exchanges with the USSR. The Soviets 
would continue to develop close ties with their traditional trading partners in 
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. And the 
departure of the Pinochet government removed obstacles to normalization and 
development of similar ties with Chile. Seventh, the USSR was prepared to 




region and guarantee any treaty that might result. Eighth, it attached great 
importance to Central American governments' newly developed potential for 
conflict resolution and supported diplomatic negotiations to end conflicts.31 
While these points represented a considerable advance over past policies, it 
must also be noted that deideologization of foreign policies did not terminate the 
pursuit of Soviet interests. As these policies developed gradually over several years 
it is clear that Moscow sought mainly to ensure the survival of a reformed but secure 
pro-Soviet regime in Nicaragua. Soviet analysts, and undoubtedly Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs officials, like their alter egos in the US, likely expected the 
Sandinistas to win any election, particularly as they controlled the rules of that 
election. Second, Moscow hoped that by supporting these principles and policies 
it could secure a legitimate role in Central America, as it tried to do elsewhere in 
other regional crises, as a legitimate participant in defining security arrangements. 
In other words, here as elsewhere, Moscow sought to win a political role by 
negotiation that it could not win by force.32 It also hoped to divert American pressure 
away from Managua and devise a security regime that limited US opportunities for 
intervention against pro-Soviet or revolutionary Latin American regimes, provided 
they did not stimulate US fears by excessive revolutionary fervor. 
More precisely, Moscow still sought to dismantle the Monroe Doctrine 
whose foundation in Washington's eyes remained the exclusion of Soviet influence 
over Latin America. The difference is that Moscow now sought these aims through 
a cooperative framework with regional security blocs, who were a stronger barrier 
to the US, and on the basis of the pursuit of traditional Realpolitik interests. The 
implications of this view gradually made themselves felt by 1987. Moscow's 
support for revolutionaries in Latin America gradually declined as it began to 
counsel its clients to support the peace program and peaceful political change rather 
than attempt to forcefully overthrow or organize to overthrow repressive or liberal 
governments.33 
A second consequence of new thinking's gradual triumph was Moscow's 
turnaround in support of the Contadora process and later the Arias plan. In effect 
Moscow came to see that far from being handmaidens of US policy in the region, 
Central and Latin American states could come together en bloc to impose a regional 
barrier of their own self-assertion against Washington. Hence, during 1986-88, 
Moscow revamped its policies to support these proposals enthusiastically, even as 
it poured its highest arms levels into Nicaragua.34 The third consequence of this 
policy was that it allowed Moscow to continue to pour in those large quantities of 
military and other assistance to Managua and presumably the FMLN as long as the 
US refused to accept the Arias plan or other regional proposals for ending the 
conflict in Central America. Thus plans for high levels of arms aid, as testified to 
by Roger Miranda, continued through 1988 with the figures rising during 1985-88 
for military transfers.35 Indeed, the new Soviet position tied progress on resolving 
the regional conflicts to the cessation of US military assistance to the Contras, which 





One might ask why it took so long for Moscow to adopt a less belligerent 
policy in Central America as it deideologized its foreign policy, especially with 
regard to threatening vital American interests in an area clearly marginal to Soviet 
security interests? After all, if one compares Soviet interests there with those in the 
Middle East, the futility of pursuing adventurist policies in the Middle East, an 
infinitely more urgent region to Moscow, became clear even before this occurred 
in Nicaragua. The dangers in the Middle East were not only that Moscow might be 
dragged into conflict to defend its ally or client, Syria, but that war there might 
involve the regional belligerents and the superpowers in a war of ballistic missiles 
and weapons of mass destruction.37 
Moreover, by 1987 prominent officials like Primakov could declare to a 
Western audience that Moscow had no class interests in the Middle East, only state 
interests, and obviously important ones at that.38 Therefore, Soviet policy in 1987 
visibly changed to counsel restraint, political solutions, downgraded arms transfers, 
improved relations with Israel, and superpower collaboration. If Soviet Near 
Eastern policy by 1987 was governed by such prudential considerations what held 
up progress on the much more marginal Nicaragua until 1989-90? 
Soviet scholars who dealt with this question pointed to the coalition of old 
thinkers, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Soviet military resistance to the change in policy, 
thereby validating Mikoyan's insight about a coalition of interest groups or lobbies 
who challenged Perestroika and the new thinking. According to Stanchenko, the 
"oldies" clung to traditional arguments that Reagan's policies were on the brink of 
failure and therefore opportunities for advances in Central and Latin America were 
promising; that Soviet involvement in the region was, in any case, insignificant, and 
in no way a threat to Washington; and that socialist allies should be assisted 
against imperialism. Stanchenko also notes that the very marginality, in 
relative terms, of this issue on the Soviet agenda (and by implication its crucial 
quality for both Managua, Havana, and those bureaucracies concerned with the 
issue) worked against a speedy superpower resolution of Nicaragua's civil war 
and its related issues.39 
Thus these forces relied upon traditional canons of Leninist thinking about 
the objective incompatibility of socialism and capitalism in the international arena, 
ie, a class and ideological approach that traditionally meant the victorious suppres-
sion of the conflict by force.40 Not surprisingly, the main channel for Cuban and 
probably Sandinista opposition to any settlement in Moscow was, according to 
Soviet specialists, the military and KGB.41 The multifaceted cooperation of these 
institutional forces with the Cuban military and the benefits gained thereof undoubt-
edly imparted a strong element of bureaucratic inertia to the support for continued 
high levels of militarization of the conflict. And the same undoubtedly held true for 
the ties with Nicaragua, inasmuch as a sizable military buildup was under way for 
Managua as well. Soviet analysts came to criticize the Sandinistas too for 
contributing (although they also admitted that they had little room for maneuver or 
alternative experience to appeal to) to the militarization and ideologization of the 
region and its evolution into a center of the Cold War.42 
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But that fact hardly exhausts the reasons for the Sandinista obstruction of 
Soviet-policy. Virtually every analyst, Soviet and American alike, concurred that 
Moscow did not aim to challenge directly American military power in the region and 
that in this sense its policy was to some degree cautious and adhered to "the rules 
of the game." The introduction of high- performance aircraft into the region was an 
American "line in the sand" that delimited one of the lines Moscow must not cross 
in this contest and Moscow knew it. Nonetheless, despite the fact that such aircraft 
were not needed for Managua's security, Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista govern-
ment repeatedly pressed Moscow for such systems during 1983-87. In this 
campaign its tactics resembled those of Castro during the 1960s when he pressed 
Moscow to extend state of the art systems and/or deterrence to it.43 
Nicaragua's pestering of Moscow for systems that it had to know would 
touch off a major crisis and perhaps risk a war was by no means unique among Soviet 
clients. Not only was it reminiscent of Castro's importuning of Moscow, it also 
resembled Syria's efforts to commit Moscow more firmly to it in the Middle East. 
In both cases the net result of such commitments would be to surrender Soviet 
discretion and flexibility to an ally who pursued interests not wholly to Moscow's 
liking and which were likely to escalate regional tensions to the superpower level 
and perhaps even to higher levels of military conflict. 
In the Middle East Syria, in 1982, couched its appeal for sophisticated air 
defense and missile systems against Israel in terms of a US plan to use Israel as a 
further springboard for aggression into Lebanon. The calculation was that nothing 
would so stimulate Moscow to send arms as the invocation of the US threat.44 
Syria's defense minister, Mustafa Tlas, in 1989 told an interviewer that war with 
Israel would be good for Syria because it would rupture the Soviet rapprochement 
with Israel and bring them closer to Damascus. When the interviewer asked if that 
is the case why did you not start the war, he replied that timing was "up to us to 
decide" and involved questions of preparedness. In other words, it was effective 
Israeli deterrence, backed up by US extended deterrence against Syria and the 
USSR that induced Syrian caution.45 Similarly, Soviet analysts realized by 1985 
that the transfer of advanced ballistic missile systems into the Middle East meant 
that the superpowers were losing control over events there and that the Reagan 
policy of globalizing regional tensions in such a situation threatened world peace.46 
The foregoing indicates that for Syria, the pursuit of strategic parity with 
Israel was just another word for the arms race and we may surmise that Nicaraguan 
requests for jet aircraft and weapons should be viewed comparably. Equally likely 
is the possibility that it was US deterrence of Managua, Havana, and Moscow that 
probably precluded further Sandinista offensives into neighboring countries during 
this time. The consequences of such invasions into Central American states, though 
perhaps beneficial to the revolutionary cause of the Sandinistas and Castro, were 
extremely ominous to Moscow, especially as its interests in such operations had to 
be much less than its concern over Middle Eastern developments. Thus, for Moscow 
in Central America it became ultimately a question of reasserting its pursuit of 
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Soviet national interests and not that of Managua or Havana just as was the case in 
the Middle East.47 Once it became clear that the Bush Administration would abide 
by Nicaragua's election results and would not supply arms to the Contras and that 
the Arias plan provided an effective mechanism for conflict resolution and presum-
ably safeguarding the Sandinistas, it became a desirable vehicle in Soviet eyes for 
restraining US interference with Managua and relieving itself of an issue that 
threatened Gorbachev's overriding interest in a detente with Washington. 
This could not be said for Castro or the Sandinistas. They evidently felt 
impelled to push for "the revolution without borders" by aiding the FMLN offensive 
in El Salvador by shipping the rebels Soviet and bloc weapons in November 1989, 
shortly after Shevarnadze had left Managua and just before a Bush-Gorbachev 
summit. This probably was an attempt, similar in intent to the statements by 
Mustafa Tlas, to pressure Moscow into supporting its revolutionary offensive. 
However, it backfired and Moscow held to its stated intention to terminate arms 
shipments and accept the election's results. Castro was also decidedly cool 
toward the Arias plan. But here too he could not afford to attack Moscow's 
support so openly, since that would jeopardize his position with Gorbachev and 
prevent attainment of what had been his minimum aim, Sandinista possession 
of Nicaragua.48 
More to the point is the fact that Castro had to realize that settlement of the 
only regional conflict in Latin America would put his regime and its precarious 
economic position squarely on the agenda of Soviet-American relations and that he 
would not be able to exercise anything like his past influence on Soviet policy in 
Latin America. But these considerations did not deflect Moscow which had the 
power, thanks to arms transfers, to moderate its clients' behavior. In any case, all 
three states probably expected a clear Sandinista victory in the elections, an 
outcome which would have bought time, allowed for consolidation of the Sandinista 
regime, and for the possibility of a future advance.49 
Castro's concerns were magnified by the fact that in 1989-90, the full 
magnitude of the crisis in Soviet-Cuban economic relations became clear. Second, 
the campaign of Glasnost and Perestroika, which was reaching its climax within the 
USSR, threatened his domestic position. Indeed, these two phenomena were linked 
inasmuch as Soviet critics of Castro and foreign aid to Cuba were given something 
approaching a free hand to attack those subjects during 1989-90, to Cuba's acute 
discomfiture. Meanwhile, Castro's rejection of domestic reforms led Soviet 
officials and reformers to label him, in perhaps the most unkindest cut of all, an 
anachronism. 
A clear example of the disjunction between Moscow and Havana in regard 
to regional conflicts in Central America was the two capitals' reaction to the FMLN 
offensive in late 1989. In a series of statements during 1989, Cuban officials had 
reiterated their support for the export of revolution, though Gorbachev explicitly 
disavowed the export of revolution and counter-revolution in his trip to Havana. 
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Thus, Gorbachev endorsed Primakov's 1988 line. When the FMLN offensive 
began Castro stated, 
I believe the action that the Salvadoreans are presently carrying out is 
one of the most extraordinary feats ever—Look how those people can 
fight — They are showing imperialism that the people will continue 
fighting without caring about the euphoria that currently overcomes 
the imperialists.50 
Moscow's reaction, as expressed in Managua, was much different. Euro-
pean diplomatic reports from there indicated that the Soviet ambassador gathered 
Nicaraguan and Cuban officials on 28 November 1989, five days after President 
Bush blamed Moscow for supplying arms to Castro and eventually El Salvador, and 
"really read them the riot act."51 Clearly, Nicaraguan and Cuban assistance in 
intensifying the Central American crisis, in advance of the Nicaraguan election and 
in violation of the Arias plan and the recent accords with Washington to desist from 
military aid to the Contras, threatened to undo all of Moscow's hard-won achieve-
ments in negotiating with Washington and securing a role as a legitimate 
regional voice. 
It is a measure of the importance of the detente with Washington and its 
pledge to respect Soviet security interests in Central America that Ambassador 
Nikolayenko's tirade to Cuban and Nicaraguan officials in November 1989, 
reversed a policy decision that had only been made in April. At that time Vadim 
Perfiliev, the first deputy head of the Information Administration of the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ie, its press officer, stated that, 
The Soviet Union thinks that Honduras' proposal, to link this issue 
(demobilization, repatriation, and movement of the Contras) to the 
demobilization of Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front detach-
ments in El Salvador, which was supported by Costa Rica and El 
Salvador, contradicts the spirit and letter of the agreements reached at 
the latest meeting of Central American Presidents.52 
What appears to have prompted this reversal of policy was Moscow's 
success in securing Washington's pledge to abide by the election result in Nicaragua 
and its willingness to consider the USSR a real dialogue partner in Central America 
with regard to resolving conflicts there. These twin objectives weighed heavily in 
Soviet thinking on the region and in its goals for Soviet policy there.53 Therefore, 
it is not surprising that Moscow was reported to be livid about the use of its weapons 
(surface-to-air missiles) in El Salvador and that it then pressured Ortega into 
accepting a reversal of the policy enunciated in April 1989.54 And the Soviet rebuff 
to Managua was clearly a forceful one which finally persuaded the Sandinistas that 
their policy of deliberately antagonizing Washington to solidify Soviet commit-
ment would not work. Moscow would pursue its aims in the region where the 
minimum goal of assuring Sandinista political power apparently had been won but 
was now jeopardized by a "frivolous" adventure.55 
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Accordingly, Moscow pressured the Sandinistas from mid-1989 on to have 
a "clean" election even as it harvested the benefits of its newly created "detente with 
Washington in the area."56 By the same token, US intervention in Panama at the end 
of 1989 was interpreted by some in Moscow as a warning of what might happen if 
the Sandinistas broke their pledges about the election or as a threat to intervene 
there.57 While Moscow reassured Nicaragua of its support for the election and its 
outcome, this did not reassure Castro or the Sandinistas. Soviet transmissions 
apparently suggested that they strongly remonstrated with Moscow about its 
seeming acquiescence to or collusion with Washington.58 Equally interesting is the 
possibility that Nicaraguan and Cuban attempts to face up to the pressure for 
domestic reform differed, with Castro purging his military and adopting a defiant 
attitude that did not go well with Nicaragua's leaders, who grudgingly but "publicly 
announced their commitment to economic reform, elections and believed that 
afterwards the United States would bail them out".59 
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Soviet conservatives felt menaced by the revolutions 
of 1989 in Eastern Europe, Moscow's acceptance of them, and by the seemingly 
victorious tide of Perestroika in the USSR. Both states and their Soviet allies well 
knew that these events put the future of their states in some jeopardy as the growing 
press campaign against Castro and Soviet foreign aid to Cuba and Nicaragua 
indicated. Inasmuch as Soviet military and right-wing forces against reform 
counterattacked in 1990, the delivery of MiG-29 planes to Cuba, as a tangible sign 
of support for Castro, whose speeches since the Panama intervention betrayed a 
growing sense of threat and belligerency — indeed some would say paranoia — 
appears to have won support from Moscow.60 However, those considerations 
applied to Cuban policy, a subject that became entangled in the domestic struggle 
for power and reform.61 
By cooperating with Washington and accepting the results of the Nicaraguan 
election on 25 February 1990, Moscow secured its status as a regional participant 
in Central American security issues. American officials came to value Soviet 
involvement in Central America now that it no longer supported revolutionary 
violence there. This contrasted with Cuba's continuing support for the FMLN.62 
Moscow also attributed its gains in Central and Latin America to participation in 
resolving the Central American wars. These claims were clearly intended to deny 
that Soviet Russia participated in these issues strictly on American sufferance. 
Nonetheless, Moscow visibly attributed its success in winning greater diplomatic 
recognition and opportunities for trade there to its cooperation with Washington. 
Unfortunately, because Gorbachev proved unable and unwilling to accept the need 
for substantial domestic reform, all these gains crumbled along with the Soviet 
Union in 1991. That domestic unwillingness to adapt to new realities and needs 
contradicted the previously adaptive Soviet policies in Latin America and else-
where, and undid almost all of Moscow's former foreign policy positions, testified 
again to the interplay of domestic reform and successful foreign policy creativity. 
In 1990-91 Soviet officials positively evaluated Latin American progress 
toward democratization, retreat of military governments from power, economic 
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integration, trade deals with the USSR, and support for Latin American conflict 
resolution or disarmament initiatives.63 In general, Moscow wished to see these 
states cohere and find a greater place in world politics, precisely because they would 
then resist American influence and tend more toward a dialogue with Moscow as 
a counter-weight to Washington. Therefore, the USSR actively promoted those 
trends which corresponded with its real, as opposed to its ideological, interests.64 
The irony of this situation lays in the fact that just when Moscow secured the 
recognition it had always coveted in Central America, it lost the means of effectively 
utilizing that new-found influence. A cardinal point in the new thinking was that 
Moscow's real influence on world politics was exercised through the medium of its 
economic-political vitality. The galloping depression, political paralysis, and 
ultimate breakup of the empire in 1990-91 could hardly tempt Latin American states 
into qualitatively expanding commercial ties with the USSR or now Russia or into 
closer security relationships with Moscow. At the same time the ascendancy of the 
right wing in Soviet policy in 1990-91 also carried a disquieting message for Latin 
Americans. 
First was a noticeable diminution of attacks on Cuban policy in the Soviet 
media. A trade deal for 1991 was signed and, though clearly the product of hard 
bargaining, it did temporarily stabilize the situation. In 1990-91 Soviet specialists 
toned down their attacks on Castroism and earnestly urged the United States to 
normalize relations with Cuba in order to defuse a potentially provocative situation. 
Thus Primakov, in February 1990, challenged Secretary of State Baker to abjure the 
use of force in Latin America, thereby easing Castro's fears, as the price of obtaining 
a change in Soviet policies towards Cuba and Sandinista Nicaragua.65 
Cuba, meanwhile, unable to hide its fears, and never receiving such assur-
ances from Washington, came under an internal state of what must be described as 
siege or preparation for war by Castro. Desperate economic conditions have led to 
what can only be called a process of deindustrialization that has continued well into 
the present (mid-1993). Castro's rhetoric has become more apocalyptic and 
militaristic. He has called Cuba the last trench of socialism and ended many 
speeches with the cry "socialism or death." More ominously, charges have been 
made that North Korea contracted with Cuba to export missiles and anti-air systems 
and to facilitate exchanges of chemical warfare technology.66 
Also in 1990-91, the temporary ascendancy of the right in Soviet politics 
strengthened Castro's position and led Soviet leaders like then Prime Minister 
Pavlov to invoke the desirability of copying Pinochet's model of martial law to 
restabilize the country^ Soviet conservatives ominously employed the Latin 
American model for the USSR in a most pessimistic manner. One Soviet Latin 
Americanist then observed that modernization of the Soviet system was occurring 
under conditions that called to mind Peru and Colombia. Accordingly, dictatorship 
was not to be shunned if it provided a basis for meeting the real socioeconomic 
aspirations of people, or in Soviet terms, socialist justice and a more egalitarian 
income distribution. According to this scenario, Soviet conditions and Latin 
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American ones were not structurally dissimilar. And to prevent the breakup of the 
entire socio-political order authoritarian rule would be justified.67 
This turn in Soviet politics suggests that the manner in which Moscow related 
to the problems of conflict resolution in a Third World state at any time directly 
reflected its internal balance of forces. The instinct to copy Pinochet was also 
reflected in some Far Eastern specialists or elites' invocation of the repressive South 
Korean model of development under the generals of the 1970s and 1980s and 
reflected the thawing of ties with Seoul. We have suggested that the progress 
Moscow made in resolving these conflicts was directly tied to the outcome of its 
political struggles at home even if that is not the exclusive factor of analysis. This 
examination suggests that in an age when the new Russia confronts ethnic conflicts 
not altogether unlike those in Central America or Afghanistan, on its borders, that 
a key variable determining Russian policy toward conflict resolution will be the 
balance of forces inside the Russian government. 
This analysis of past Soviet policies not only suggests that foreign policies 
are often the outcome of the domestic policy process and struggles. There also 
existed a complex series of institutional and political linkages between foreign and 
ruling Communist parties and the actors within the Soviet process, a relationship 
that Eastern Europe's participation in Soviet Third World policies made even more 
complex. One only need cite in that connection the role played by Walter Ulbricht 
in 1964 in unseating Khrushchev and in 1968 in instigating the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. Any future history of Soviet policies in these conflicts might well 
give more consideration to these political linkages within the bloc as key factors of 
analysis. Gorbachev's policies toward Eastern Europe and the relationship of 
Moscow to those states in 1985-89 also provides an opportunity for analyzing those 
linkages. These linkages also supplied the secondary actors, Cuba and Nicaragua, 
with the effective means of influencing or even obstructing for some time Soviet 
policies that affected their vital interests which, in the final analysis, were relatively 
marginal ones to Moscow. Thus, Managua and Nicaragua were able to command 
a high level of military aid even when the policy was supposedly oriented against 
such transfers and public declarations of the termination of arms transfers had 
taken place. 
Another factor that emerges from this analysis is the fact that Moscow's 
clients displayed a permanent tendency to try and bind Moscow more closely to 
them, to commit Moscow by pursuing what can only be called adventurist policies 
of spreading revolution and conflict into neighboring countries. This was true for 
Grenada, Nicaragua, and Cuba and certainly was also true for Vietnam, Syria, and 
North Korea. This fact suggests another line of analysis for historians of the Cold 
War and of Soviet policies, perhaps even a permanently operating principle of 
relationships among socialist states and their allies. Such policies inevitably 
intensified Cold War tensions, going back to the Korean War. By 1985 they had led 
to an entangling of regional tensions in Central America and elsewhere, with the 
escalating superpower conflict. More precisely, Moscow's clients' adventuristic 
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policies threatened to lead Moscow into further conflicts (Afghanistan could easily 
serve as another example) and Gorbachev's new thinking represented as much an 
attempt to reassert control over them as it was to ameliorate relations with 
Washington. 
Finally, the chronicle of this process of conflict resolution suggests that US 
deterrent capability and willingness to fight back through proxies substantially 
limited the scope for militant action open to Moscow's clients and to the USSR 
during the 1980s. And the outcome of Operation DESERT STORM in 1990-91 
reinforces this likelihood, despite the revolutionary changes in world affairs. One 
need not enter the American political debate about the wisdom of Reagan Admin-
istration policies to note that they did substantially raise the costs to Moscow of such 
intervention and constrain it from committing itself wholly to the Sandinistas' and 
Castro' s adventurist policies. To say this is not to deny as well that Moscow at some 
level encouraged such actions. Rather, it is to point out that when the targets of such 
adventures banded together to retaliate by both political and military means, Soviet 
caution and willingness to sacrifice relatively marginal interests for the sake of its 
fundamental security manifested themselves. Thus the study and analysis of 
conflict resolution in Central America suggests insights not only into the history of 
Soviet policies in this region but in general, ie, for security policy making 
alignments and processes at home and for other conflicts. 
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